Introduction
On Thoreau, Walking, & Nature Environmentalists across the gamut of movements widely quote Henry David Thoreau's v\/ritings in the service of a call to ecological action. "In Wildness is the preservation of the vi/orld"a clipped quote from the short essay "Walking"has become a rallying call to ethical stewardship, management, and preservation of some ill-defmed nature.
This reading of Thoreau fundamentally misappropriates his definition of "wildness" and the spirit in which he uses the word. It confuses wildness with wilderness and assumes an allegiance to an objective environmentalist end.
In fact, Thoreau' s ideas are more in concordance with the concept of the rhizome, smooth space, and nomadism as proposed by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. Thoreau 's writing deserves a place in modern discourse in the hope that his wildness may reveal a method for reading, writing, and understanding nature and the cultural landscape.
This wildness, a form of extreme self-consciousness, requires what Peter Fritzell calls "a tolerance for ambiguity that is very difficult to sustain. It is, in essence, a dedication to paradox, and even an occasional delight in uncertainty, that can be extremely unsettling."' It IS this ambiguity that Denatured hopes to investigate. Thoreau, Walking, and the Instantaneous Redefinition of Nature In some sense, the act of walking as described by Thoreau embodies a worldview oddly placed in intellectual history.
In the midst of the Enlightenment and at the dawn of the Industrial Revolution, Thoreau called for a dynamic understanding of nature that transcended the contemporary emerging discussion on environmental issues. Modern environmentalism, a product of the sensibilities of Pmchot and the romanticism of Muir, embraces Enlightenment conceptions of objectivity and rationality and finds itself mired in the twentieth century discourse of social and power relations. Fritzell suggests that the dominant rhetorical stance of applied science, environmental dis-course, and writing about nature is fundamentally positivistic and representational.^While Thoreau's conception of nature found its stylistic roots in both eastern philosophy (especially Hinduism) and European romanticism, his description of walking is fundamentally outside of the positivistic dialectics that enforce and entail a view of relations between language and experience in which words are devices of representation. Thoreau's text is, in its constant self-examination, more akin to Barthes, Foucault, and Derrida and their denial of the objective nature of discourse. Unfortunately, the legacy of post-modern discourse is a malaise of sorts, unable to assign value to ideas, and devoid of ethics. Thoreau's walking begins to provide some ground for ethics, and more than ethicsan inner experience of spirituality more akin to Bataillewhich has been seemingly lost in modernity.T horeau begins his treatise on walking by diminishing the importance of civil freedoms. He seeks to "speak a word for nature, for the absolute freedom and wildness" therein.^He presents the walker as saunterer, and locates him outside of Church and State and People. It is here, alone, that the walker must face Fritzell's ambiguity, sans terre, without a land or home, but equally at home everywhere.
To even begin a walk, one must be prepared to cast off one's entire history, both civil and personal:
The thought of some work will run in my head and I am not where my body is -I am out of my senses. In my walks I would fain return to my senses. What business have I in the woods if I am thinking of something out of the woods?-In every sense, Thoreau demands an absolute commitment to walking, so much so that he implicates the entire self in the act and can accept no alternative.
Much has been made of Thoreau's understanding of locality, but as he discusses the walks within a ten mile radius of his home his interest is not in viewing linked points and setting destinations but in an evolving relationship to the land. For Thoreau, the space through which walking transpires constantly folds. Points may remain, but trajectories redefine themselves on each walk, and while the same raw material remains, the state of the walker is in flux. So then, a walk unfolds not in allocation of space, but in internal re-experience. This unfolding takes place, largely, outside of the village (or, as Thoreau's etymological study suggests, the place where many walks converge.)
The space occupied in a walk defies linearity and striation, and though it may turn in on itself or down a previously abandoned road (such as the case with the poem "Old Marlborough Road"), new meaning is constantly discovered.
Ethics, Responsibility, and the Genius of Knov/ledge The responsibility involved in walking is found not so much in where to walk, but how to walk:
What IS it that makes it so hard sometimes to determine whither we will walk?. ..There is a right way; but we are very liable from heedlessness and stupidity to take the wrong one. We would fam take that walk, never yet taken by us through this actual world, which is perfectly symbolical of the path which we love to travel in the interior and ideal world; and sometimes, no doubt, we find it difficult to choose direction, because it does not yet exist distinctly in our idea.T horeau concerns himself primarily with internal direction, and relies on nature to provide the ethics of the walk. We are, in fact, "part and parcel to nature"; that is, on the fractal boundary of the ever-changing with the whole of our options understood instantaneously within the moment of advancement.' Nature itself provides all the information a walker needs and allows the walker to transcend the path behind and enter into the very order of things. The responsibility, then, is not in the surveying out of space and laying of lines (or the organization of knowledge,) but rather in the attentiveness to subtle changes and the acquisition of new, indeterminate knowledge.
Genius is a light which makes the darkness visible, like a lightning's flash, which perchance shatters the temple of knowledge itself, -and not a taper lighted at the hearth-stone of the race, which pales before the light of common day.Ĝ enius, a sort of communion with nature, shatters knowledge and tells us that we know nothing. More truly, it informs us that what we thought we knew is but a scion of that which there is to know. Onwards and ever expanding, linearity collapses and nature moves in all directions simultaneously This also denies the need for a predictable and traceable direction of knowledge within history. The practical upshot of such knowledge of nature is not to get lost in possibility and deny purpose, but to spread purpose outward in infinite directions. So, one may walk many places at once and inhabit many landscapes, some folding in on themselves and reintroducing knowledge to the feedback loop, and some moving steadily outward. Thoreau, then, "demands something that no culture can give," for no store of knowledge can keep up with one who walks as part and parcel to nature." This expansion is essentially reflected in the rhizomatic idea of Deleuze and Guattari. The rhizomatic principles of connection and heterogeneity, multiplicity, and asignifying rupture all hold true in Thoreau's walking, meaning that any point of a rhizome can and must be connected to the whole. This is the embodiment of the part and parcel of nature that Thoreau expounds. Nature, described for the single walker, is described for all. The multiplicity, in its substantive sense, loses a subjective/objective relationship to nature, for the individual walks (of myriad walkers) retain independence only insofar as they are discrete directions of growth. The asignifying rupture and consequent regrowth is found in Thoreau's understanding of progress.
Such motion is outward, and transcends an enlightenment science that moves only forward. The scientific method, hampered by its own boundaries, then becomes merely useful, and can offer no definition of nature. It is concerned, by definition, with what is already conceivable and can only move outside of itself through the wild actions of those who are both genius and scientist, those prepared to shatter knowledge, or more likely, unconcerned with knowledge at all. These scientists become, as it were, walkers. Thoreau is calling for an expanded contact with naturea continuous evolution in the place of strict linearity of purpose: [A] Knowledge useful in a higher sense: for what is most of out boasted so-called knowledge but a conceit that we know something, which robs us of the advantage of our actual ignorance?. ..My desire for knowledge is intermittent, but my desire to bathe my head in atmospheres unknown to my feet is perennial and constant. The highest that we can attain is not Knowledge, but Sympathy with Intelligence.'" Thoreau, then, places the walker on a sort of border life.
He intimates an ethics of walking, and, consequently, an ethics of the search for and use of knowledge. TS. Mc-Millin, in Our Preposterous Use of Literature, suggests that Thoreau's approach towards reading smoothly makes the transition to walking, and, if "reading is nothing other than a method of thinking [and] of gathering the world;" it is essentially a form of walking."
Marcus 5
Walking in the Space Between Thoreau' s call for a constant redefinition of nature is as Fritzell promised, ambiguous and difficult. Deleuze and Guattari, wtiile making similar observations, demand less and elucidate more. It is in thie juxtaposition of the tfiree writers' conception of nature that a true ethic may be revealed.
bound by the civilized apparatus, that Thoreau calls each individual to shorten the time between cataclysms and constantly redefine our participation in landscapea sort of instantaneous evolution. The cultural denial of Deleuze and Guatten's war machine is exactly what Thoreau means by "a wildness whose glance no civilization can endure." Civilization (and the clear path though the village) is the striated space that denies wildness. Jaques Derrida, in his essay "Differance", offers a crucial link between Thoreau and Deleuze and Guattari:
Finally, a strategy without finality, what might be called blind tactics, or empirical wandering if the value of empiricism did not itself acquire its entire meaning in its opposition to philosophical responsibility.
If there is a certain wandering in the tracing of differance. it no more follows the lines of philosophical-logical discourse than that of its symmetrical and integral inverse, empirical discourse. The concept of play keeps itself beyond this opposition, announcing, on the eve of philosophy and beyond it. the unity of chance and necessity in calculations without end.'-The concept of differance situates itself in the space between, in the smooth space of Deleuze and Guattan's nomad and m the scope of Thoreau's walk. Play allows a movement in the space between and moving through Thoreau's literal sunset to Derrida's eve to Deleuze and Guattan's rhizomatic nose, and here we find that "unity of chance and necessity in calculations without end" that allows Thoreau endless walks and the nomad limitless speed.
Thoreau, in fact, explicitly leaves room for play for the uncertainty of the space between: I would not have every man nor every part of man cultivated any more than I would have every acre of earth cultivated: part will be tillage, but the greater part will be meadow and forest...'-' Deleuze and Guattari discuss this same middle in "A Thousand Plateaus": It's not easy to see things in the middle rather than looking down on them from above or up at them from below, or from left to right it right to left: try it, you'll see that everything changes. It's not easy to see grass in things and in words."
Smooth space takes advantage of this middle and leaves us with room for play in which to encounter nature. We set our lines of sight and so have intermittent, personal cataclysms. At these times, the technological or enlightened state (or, alternatively, the ever-expanding opportunistic global consumerism) appropriates the walking nomad into its war machine in a desperate attempt at self-preservation. It IS through constant wildness, or refusal to be Wildness in Design Through Thoreau's conception of walking. I have explored how one may begin to read and experience knowledge and landscape rhizomatically. It is more difficult to conceive of how one may design and build architecture or landscape that embodies the smooth space of the rhizome. Architecture and landscape design does not seem to achieve true smooth space in that the viewer/inhabitant/walker's mind cannot be manipulated. The experience of a place, in plan and section, cannot necessarily draw a visitor or inhabitant into a pre-defined smooth space, and such a space is a self-denying paradox. Texture, light, and situation may begin to set the conditions for what Bernard Tschumi calls an "event-space", but ultimately the true experience of the smooth space is left to the observer. If production and representation work to move the eventspace closer to the moment of design and observation, a true smooth space of built form may be reached. That is, the process of design may become more important than the representation and the realization. While it is difficult to find examples of a building or landscape conceived to be in a constant state of design, we can look to the integrity of modes of representation as an indication, and the concept of a tracing and a map may be invoked.
The rhizome is altogether different, a map and not a tracing....What distinguishes the map from the tracing IS that it IS entirely oriented towards an experiment in contact with the real. The map does not reproduce the unconscious closed m upon itself: it constructs the unconscious.'T he map can begin to mark smooth space by redefining space itself and examining dynamic events within space. A map must be redrawn as the landscape of the mind changes, and as the needs of the walker evolves. It is, however, more than a data representation. It allows and demands dynamism in its reading and its production, and refuses static interpretation.
As the architect's conceptions of the intentions for the site change, the data is pliable and the map adjusts. But Deleuze and Guattari, in a constant dialectic, question their dualism and privileging of a map over a trace. In a true feedback loop, a map produces a trace produces a map, and so the image is never at rest, only caught in a moment in time.
Denatured
In design studios students are asked to investigate ideas and come forth with a complete representation of their project. In the professional world, we construct buildings and landscapes, but little room exists to re-evaluate and redesign a completed project. We hope for sustalnabillty through low energy consumption and low maintenance, but the investigation ends with construction and, if we are fashionable enough, the consideration of the design moves on to the critics.
The question, then, is how to design or write as Thoreau walksat the tip of the rhizome, or on the edge of the myriad shards of an exploded ideology, and moreover, how to let the nature of our built form continue to evolve. Design education and contemporary theoretical debate deny this.
As Deleuze and Guitarri point out, psychoanalytic theory and the expanding sphere of a global western culture abhor it. The articles in Denatured act, then as a discourse only, and welcome the infinite new directions for the reader to walk, herein. Denatured proposes that, through an active dialectic, the work presented here can begin to Illuminate the edges and folds of the space between.
Perhaps it is through the non-theoretical and nonmtuitive that IS the same time non-utilitarian that we may access the ambiguity of an ill-defined nature. For example, projects such as the library by Matthew Pierce and the works of Studio Granda as described by Petur Armannsson deal with nature on an ethical and spiritual level. Through their non-prescrlptlon and rugged refusal to align themselves with a theory other than an extreme and personal sensitivity to their physical place in the world, they are involved in constant observation, interrogation, and absolute receptivity.
Alternatively, through Nataly Gattegno's Desert Oasis, we begin to understand how the process of making architecture is as vital to understanding nature as the act of building. Mark Goulthorpe and The Fab Hab Tree House examine different ways In which technology can aid us m understanding nature while Christine Cerquiera Caspar and Stanford Kwmter question the very need for It to do so.
Finally, Sanjit Sethi's artwork questions the Impetus to examine the ambiguous in all of Its impossible complexity.
For it IS to be hoped that such an unfolding complexity and its concurrent motion brings assurance as well as spiritual tribulation, unleashing the possibility that we can "saunter towards the Holy Land, till one day the sun shall shine more brightly than it ever has done. ..and light up our lives with a great awakening light.""' Though Thoreau's lofty language has found it's way into pop psychology and the self-help lexicon, it is well to remember that genius, even at Its most pedantic and formalistic, is but a product of a mad enthusiasm for understanding nature.
Noteŝ
Peter A. Fritzell, Nature Writing and America: Essays Upon a Cultural Type.
(Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1990), 16. Ibid. "By inner experience I understand that which one usually calls mystical experience: the state of ecstasy, or rapture, at least of mediated emotion. But I am thinking less of confessional experience, to which one has had to adhere
